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THE ALLENDE REGIME IN CHILE: AN HISTORICAL
AND LEGAL ANALYSIS: PART II
BY EUGENIO VELASCO
I. INTRODUCTION
Salvador Allende assumed the Presidency of Chile on November 3,
1970, and set for himself the task of transforming the socio-economic
structure of Chile. This transformation was to be achieved not by
enacting new laws, but by taking advantage of existing legal rules, a
process later called the "theory of legal loopholes." An examination of
this practice, however, will make it evident that these were not real
loopholes, but open violations of the laws and institutions of the country,
and that they occurred in spite of a constitutional amendment which was
ratified in order to avoid them.
A. Allende's Platform and Election
Allende's platform consisted of the Popular Unity (UP) program.
The program was not Marxist, but was a point of coincidence between
Marxist and non-Marxist groups. It was based on the so-called social
democratic position. In fact, this program professed to assure the
"expansion of democracy" and to guaranty respect for the legal system,
individual rights, the rights of trade unions, political parties, including
the opposition, and the free and periodic political elections contemplated
in the Constitution and laws.
In the economic field, the Popular Unity program aimed at the
construction of an "area of social property" formed by (1) companies
that already belonged to the state, (most of which had been created
during preceding radical governments), (2) certain privately owned
companies which were to be legally expropriated, including foreign
owned companies which exploited the basic wealth of the country-
copper, nitrates, iron, iodine and coal, banks, insurance companies, the
great national monopolies, and, in general, all
those activities that condition the economic and social development of
the country, such as the production of electricity; transportation by rail,
air and sea; means of communication; the production, refining and dis-
tribution of petroleum; the steel industry; -the cement industry, the petro-
chemical and chemical industries, and the cellulose and paper com-
panies.
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The UP program also contemplated an area of "private property" in
industry, mining, agriculture and professional services. The UP pro-
gram said that the majority of all companies would fall within the area
of "private property" and that the government would give them financial
and technical assistance.
The democratic, non-Marxist tendencies of the Popular Unity were
constantly reiterated by Allende during the presidential campaign and
during the first months of his government. Thus, it was not strange to
find many points of contact between the Popular Unity program and
that of the Christian Democracy, which also propitiated fundamental
changes in the social and economic structures of the country within a
complete democratic constitutional and libertarian framework.
Despite his program, many people feared an Allende victory. The
facts were that the candidate of the UP who had obtained the largest
plurality in the general election was a declared and fervent Marxist and
that his fundamental backing came from two Marxists-Leninist parties
which were more powerful than their weak democratic allies. These
gave rise to and fermented a great fear that the professed program of the
Popular Unity would be surpassed in practice and that the executive
power would be used by Allende in violation of the Constitution and the
laws to establish in Chile a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship, putting an end
to the democratic system which seventy-five percent of the Chileans
wished to preserve.
To many Chileans, then, a clear danger existed that the will of the
majority would be subverted by the violation of the Popular Unity
program. Yet Allende had in fact won a plurality of the popular vote,
and by tradition claimed that he must be elected President by Congress.
To satisfy his claim and, at the same time to prevent the feared usurpa-
tion, the Christian Democratic Party-the single most powerful party in
the Congress, and the party whose votes would decide the election, there
proposed a solution within the Chilean constitutional and democratic
traditions. They agreed to vote for Allende, thus assuring his election
as President of the Republic, but only on condition that the Popular
Unity and Allende agreed to introduce substantial constitutional reforms
designed, or so it was believed at the time, to insure the survival of the
democratic regime.
An amendment to the Constitution was promptly approved and wide-
ly accepted. Called the "Democratic Guarantee amendment" it, among
other things, recognized and guaranteed as individual rights the free
exercise of political rights within a democratic and republican system,
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and provided for access to the media by political parties.1 This amend-
ment was approved by the Senate, after the popular election in which
Allende achieved the first relative majority, but before the Congress had
elected him President. Thus, when these reforms were adopted, Al-
lende was still a senator. He voted in favor of the constitutional
amendment and during the October, 1970 congressional session in
which the amendment was approved, he stated:
I have come here to point out through my favorable vote, the
people's decision, that when they become the government, they will
make the democracy of our country more ample and profound ...
I have come here to say that these reforms must be understood not
only as principles established by the Constitution but also as a moral
obligation in the eyes of our own conscience and of history.
A few months later President Allende was interviewed by Regis
Debray, the French writer and journalist who had been captured with
Che Guevara's guerrillas. Allende told Debray, in answer to a question
regarding the constitutional amendment, that he had accepted it because
1. The Democratic Guarantee Amendment, as it was called, provided in its most im-
portant aspects the establishment of individual rights. These included: "The free prac-
tice of the political rights within the democratic and republican system" and the right
of citizens to organize political parties; the right of a political party to have access to
the mass media, owned or controlled by the state; the right to organize, establish, and
maintain newspapers, magazines, periodicals, and radio broadcasting stations; the free
importation and commercial distribution of books, printed materials, and magazines. It
also guaranteed the individual right to freedom of education with it being established
that "the education given through the national system will be democratic and pluralistic
and will not have any official partisan orientation," that the state and private universities
recognized by the state are juridical persons possessing academic, administrative, and
economic autonomy, and that "the admission to the university will depend solely on the
candidate's suitability." Furthermore, the amendment provided that the hiring and pro-
motion of professors and researchers was to depend solely on their capacity and ability,
that the academic staff is "free to present their subject matters according to their ideas,
within their duty of introducing to the student body the necessary information about dif-
ferent doctrines and principles, including those with which they disagree, and that "the
university students have the right to express their own ideas." Finally it was expressly
recognized that the people had the right to work, including a right to organize trade
unions and to declare strikes and the right to "active participation in the social, cultural,
civic, and political and economic life, for the purpose of achieving a complete develop-
ment of the human being and his real incorporation into the national community." In
order to do this, community organizations such as centers of mothers, neighborhood
groups, unions, cooperatives, and others were given the character of juridical persons,
which enabled them to choose their own governing boards through free and secret elec-
tions. It was expressly mentioned that the "armed forces would be composed of the
army, navy, air force, and police; institutions essentially professional, disciplined, obe-
dient and non-deliberative." The size of these institutions could only be set by law and
the officer corps of the armed forces and the police force could only be drawn from
their own professional academies.
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his election was only possible with those guarantees, and because "in
that moment the only important thing was to assume the government."
This entire interview clearly indicates that his approval had been just a
matter of political strategy and would not inhibit his government. In
any case, Allende assumed the Presidency of Chile on November 3,
1970.
B. Legal Loopholes Theory
1. In General
Allende had been advised by one of his advisors, a professor of law,
that it was possible to transform the socio-economic structures in Chile
without enacting new laws, just by taking advanatage of existing legal
rules.
Among these were some law-decrees issued during the short-lived
Socialist Republic which existed in 1932 during the "anarchy period."
One of these laws, later modified and completed by constitutional
governments, allowed the requisition of products or basic goods in a
temporary and transitory form when abnormalities in the production
process made it necessary for the public interest. For example, if a
factory had in stock vital products that were very scarce in the market,
they could be requisitioned and sold to consumers. It is true that these
provisions, seldom used, had no adequate regulation and were imper-
fect, but the purposes for which they were created were clear. However,
taking advantage of these rules, the Popular Unity government requisi-
tioned in hundreds of occasions not only the products, but the producing
companies themselves. Moreover, these requisitions were not for short
transitory periods, as required by law, but were permanent, demonstrat-
ing the intention of the government to incorporate the companies into
the "area of social property." In this way, a very serious juridicial
conflict was created since a legal procedure established to permit the
temporary requisitioning of certain products was being used as a means
of dispossessing owners of their factories for the purpose of incorporat-
ing the companies into the "area of social property."
In a similar way, the same legislation allowed government "interven-
tion" into the management of a company, even in agriculture, when a
labor conflict paralyzed it, and when this paralysis seriously affected the
national economy. The "intervention" meant that the government ap-
pointed an "intervenor" whose task was to manage the enterprise tem-
porarily while he looked for the quickest possible solution to the labor
conflict. The law established that the intervention ended when the
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conflict was resolved. This rule had been applied several times by
preceding governments in connection with strikes which due to their
magnitude and nature had caused national problems.
As in the case of government requisitions, the Popular Unity govern-
ment used this "loop-hole" to transfer factories from the "private area"
to the "social area." The government accomplished this by appointing
intervenors who did nothing to resolve the labor problems, thereby
allowing the interventions to become permanent and indefinite. The
companies thus intervened were considered definitively transferred to
the social area, exactly the same as those companies which had been
requisitioned.
In some instances small groups of Marxist workers provoked disturb-
ances, pleaded the existence of a labor conflict, and asked for govern-
ment intervention, which was immediately provided.2 These abuses led
to such extremes that often the newspapers published reports that the
government was studying the incorporation of certain companies into
the social area, and within a few days a group of laborers would occupy
buildings or take over the premises and the government would immedi-
ately intervene. For example, in May, 1971, the Minister of the Econo-
my announced in a speech to the country the decision of the Popular
Unity government to incorporate the large textile industries into the
social area, but made no reference to a bill dealing with this matter as
was constitutionally mandated. Hours later, groups of workers in the
country's eight largest textile factories "took over" the buildings. The
next day the Minister visited the premises which had been ".taken over"
and announced that "since there [was] a paralysis of work and, as aconsequence, there [would] be an inadequate supply of textiles for the
population," it would be legal to intervene. Thus, as had been pre-
viously decided, the UP government was able to accomplish a transfer of
the factories to the social area. From a legal point of view it is evident
in these cases of intervention that there existed not only the abuses and
arbitrariness described above, but also a serious violation of the law by
the government because of its passive attitude and because of its failure
to fulfill its constitutional duty to maintain public order and to respect
the rights of citizens.'
2. Towards the end of the Popular Unity government, interventions were made with-
out even the excuse of a labor conflict.
3. For this reason the House of Deputies, exercising one of its constitutional powers,
impeached one of Allende's ministers, the Minister of the Interior, accusing him, among
other things, of being responsible for a serious violation of the constitutional duty im-
posed on the President of the Republic and exercised by him through the Minister of
1976]
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2. The Agrarian Reform Law
The system of takeovers was especially serious in the agricultural
sector. There, the Popular Unity used the Agrarian Reform Law passed
during President Frei's administration and which was still in effect to
transfer ownership of agrarian lands to the area of "social property."
Sometimes it was the farmers themselves who, by their actions, were
responsible for a takeover. But increasingly it was extremist political
elements, who had nothing to do with agriculture, who took over farms,
pushing out the owners and settling on the farms as rebellious occu-
pants. Though the government condemned these acts publicly, it did
nothing to prevent them or to return the property to the owners. On the
contrary, because there was now a serious labor conflict, the government
intervened in the farm.
To see how the Agrarian Reform Law was illegally and arbitrarily
applied by the government, it is necessary to understand how the law,
which I believe was an important social advance, was designed to
operate.
To facilitate the complex and difficult process of agrarian reform the
law contained a series of articles that gave a large number of faculties to
the organization charged with carrying out the law, "CORA, '' 4 the Land
Reform Agency. Obviously, it was understood that these extensive
faculties had to be exercised in good faith within the spirit of the law.
The only requisite necessary for the legal expropriation of a farm was
a decision to this effect by CORA's board of directors based on one of
the causes enumerated in the law. The amount to be paid for the
expropriated land was its assessed value as determined for property tax
purposes. Any improvements, such as houses, accessory buildings of all
types, fences, irrigation works, orchards and crops, were provisionally
assessed by CORA. After depositing five to ten percent of the com-
bined value of the land and improvements in the proper tribunal, CORA
could then take actual possession of the expropriated farm. The re-
maming value was to be paid by special long-term bonds.
The same law created special Agrarian Courts as well as Agrarian
Courts of Appeal. These courts were comprised of representatives from
the judiciary, and technicians from special technical state organizations
and from private agricultural institutions. The technicians were ap-
the Interior of maintaining juridical order and social peace and the respect for the rights
of citizens. The impeachment was approved and the Minister was removed, but the gov-
ernment did not change its attitude.
4. CORA: Corporaci6n de ]a Reforma Agraria.
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pointed by the executive from a list of submitted names. The expropri-
ated owners were permitted to present complaints to these courts about
the cause of the expropriation, the provisionally assessed value of the
improvements, and could also demand their right to a "reserve;" that is,
a piece of land that the owner was to be allowed to continue to work. All
these "trials" were to take place after CORA had taken physical posses-
sion of the farm.
How did the UP government break these rules and apply them in
fraudulent ways, leaving the owners without any possibility of making
effective use of their rights? First, in the most absurd and crude way;
the government, by not issuing the decrees appointing the members, did
not establish the Agrarian Courts. Thus, the courts had no real exist-
ence and the requests or complaints presented by expropriated owners
could not be processed. Second, the rules were applied in a distorted
way, and in combination with guided "takeovers," evidenced bad faith.
This made it impossible for the owners to bring the actions contemplat-
ed by the law. For example, after a "takeover," the farm was inter-
vened on the excuse that a labor conflict existed. The administration of
the farm was transferred to the "intervenor" who did nothing to solve
the non-existent problem. Several months after the "takeover," the
expropriation of the farm was decided upon. This frequently occurred
with respect to farms which were clearly not subject to expropriation
because they were either too small (less than 80 "basic" hectares) or
they were a "reserve" of a farm previously expropriated during the Frei
administration. Furthermore, the assessments for the improvements
was ridiculously low.5
As I said, almost always the owner's complaints were not acted on
because the corresponding Agrarian Court had not been formed. When
it was, the owner was called to CORA's offices and informed that his
farm had been taken over by CORA and handed over to the farmers.
The owner was then advised that it would take two or more years for
trial, and even if he were to win, the situation would be so consolidated
that the judgment would be practically impossible to execute without
provoking serious and violent conflicts. For this reason CORA suggest-
ed that it would be better for him to agree to a prompt arrangement.
The frightened owner would then accept any sort of proposal. During a
period of time it became commonplace that owners by their own "free"
5. I professionally handled cases in which the farmhouses, barns, and buildings, irriga-
tion works, fences, farmworkers' houses, and all fixtures were assessed at 45,000 escudos,
which at that time was approximately $50.00.
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will handed over their farms to CORA in exchange for the security of
keeping a piece of land or their house.
3. Nationalization of Banks
The nationalization of the private banks is another example of the
government's incredible arbitrariness and illegality.
The Popular Unity program contemplated the expropriation of pri-
vate banks in order to reorganize and incorporate them into the "social
area." The purposes of the nationalization of the banks were to initiate
a new credit policy that would benefit the small- and medium-sized
companies through a reduction of interest rates, and to redistribute
credit in favor of large sectors usually neglected in the financial market.
According to the Constitution, a specific law had to be passed to
accomplish this purpose. On December 30, 1970, a few weeks after
Allende had assumed the Presidency, he announced in a nationally
televised speech that he had decided to send a bill to Congress to
nationalize the banking system. However, this bill was never sent to
Congress; throughout Allende's administration, members of the opposi-
tion in Congress consistently demanded introduction of the bill. But in
place of this initiative the government used an illegal and tortuous
procedure to nationalize the banks. The method chosen utilized pres-
sure and blackmail, "intervention" and since the banks involved were
public stock companies, purchase of shares sufficient to gain inside
control.
Through the Superintendency of Banks, a state institution charged
with supervision of the normal functioning of the banks, measures
designed to "asphyxiate" the banks were adopted. For example, in the
first six months of 1971, such an excessive reduction of the interest rate
was ordered that the banks lost many millions of escudos. Immediately
thereafter the government ordered the withdrawal of all state deposits
from private banks; it is not difficult to imagine how serious this was for
the banks. At the same time, in order to establish a type of state co-
administration of all the banks, the Superintendency nominated perma-
nent delegates in all banks to check the correctness of, and to control, all
transactions involving certain amounts of money.6 Prior to this, control
had always been achieved through periodic revisions. By a strange
6. After a short time, the Central Bank revoked the authority of private banks to op-
erate in the lucrative foreign exchange market. In Chile, for many years, private indi-
viduals could buy or sell foreign currency only through the banks and only with a special
official authorization.
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coincidence the Superintendency began to discover frequent irregulari-
ties in the transactions and high penalties were assessed. This practice
reached such an extreme that during the first six months of 1971 six
banks had to pay penalties equivalent to 25 percent of all profits gained
by all private banks during the preceding three months. Shortly, there-
after, several banks were "taken over" by employees who demanded that
the banks be nationalized. Given this excuse and others, such as
improper administration, the Superintendency misused its legal powers
by intervening in several banks.
Concurrent with these actions, the Allende government ordered the
Corporation to Promote Production (CORFO) to use its funds to
purchase bank shares. As CORFO was a state institution, this manuev-
er was alleged to be in violation of Chilean anti-monopoly law. The
anti-monopoly legislation, which was passed to prevent the existence of
private monopolies, allows state monopolies only when formed pursuant
to specific enabling legislation. A public prosecutor, charged with
enforcing the anti-monopoly provisions, initiated a complaint against
CORFO because of its unauthorized purchase of bank shares. Under
the law, the prosecutor's complaint was to be heard by an Anti-Monopo-
ly Commission Court composed primarily of high officials of the admin-
istration. However, the Commission declared it did not have jurisdic-
tion to hear the case. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision was
reversed, and the Commission was ordered to take jurisdiction and
decide the substantive issues. To prevent this, the government ordered
the Commission members not to appear at the sessions; thus, the Com-
mission had no quorum. The Court was never convened during the
Allende administration.
By all these synchronized illegal means, the government achieved its
objective of expropriating private banks without Congress' consent and
without sending a bill as it had promised. A year after all these
strategics had begun, 15 banks were in the government's hands and the
government owned the majority of the shares in the remaining eleven.
4. Nationalization of Television Stations
According to the Constitution and laws of Chile, only the State and
the universities recognized by the State were authorized to establish
television stations. The law that regulated telecommunications express-
ly authorized three universities to maintain television stations: the
University of Chile, which belongs to the State; the Catholic University
of Santiago; and the Catholic University of Valparaiso. In addition
1976]
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there was the National Television Channel, which had been established
during Frei's Presidency. This was the only channel which in fact
reached nearly the entire country. The others, while authorized to
establish channels throughout the country, had not done so for economic
reasons. This channel was not only forbidden to adopt a political
position but also had to be objective in its reporting, and had to respect
the right of all political parties to make use of its facilities pursuant to
regulations. Under Allende, the National Channel, in violation of the
existing rules, was turned into a political voice of the Marxists. It
broadcast only news that was of interest to the government, distorting it
as it pleased and even rudely attacking opposition parties.7
Protests, even in Congress, were futile. And even though these
violations of law were used as the grounds for impeachment of the
Minister of the Interior, the situation remained unchanged. During the
impeachment debate, it was established that the National Channel was
"monopolitical"; i.e., it only expressed the Marxist political position. It
had been used to attack and impute crimes to opposition deputies
without allowing them a "right to respond" as required by law. The
National Channel had refused to broadcast communications of opposi-
tion parties as required by law. Instead, it gave extended coverage to all
news concerning extreme leftist and revolutionary groups, which were
not legally established political parties. Finally, it openly attacked the
Church and even different ethnic groups residing in Chile which it did
not consider devoted enough to the government.
The state-owned University of Chile Channel, whose authorities,
predominantly non-UP, had been freely and democratically elected by
the university community, was "taken over" by a group of workers who
rebelled against the legitimate managers and began broadcasting under
the control of extremist leaders. Their programs were even more
partial, abusive, and derogatory than those of the National Channel. At
first, these "occupiers" refused to broadcast the official news of the
university; later they refused to permit university officials to enter the
building in which the station was located. This situation continued for
almost a year; the complaints and actions presented to the government
were ineffectual. The government did not respond to protect the rights
of its own university, simply because the station's legal authorities were
not UP militants.
7. The national newsreel (noticiero) became known as the "menticiero," which is a
play on the verb mentir, to lie.
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In 1973, the authorities of the University of Chile decided to bring a
criminal action against the occupying workers. The court ordered that
the premises be restored to the legitimate authorities and forbade the
occupants to broadcast. However, the executive refused to provide the
assistance of public force to carry out the court's decision.8
During the "take over," doubting it would ever recover its channel,
the University of Chile decided, in exercise of its legal right, to establish
another channel elsewhere. The work was done quickly and secretly. In
July 1973, the University of Chile officially began broadcasting. Two
days later, under orders of the Intendente of Santiago, the police raided
the new station, destroyed its installations, and arrested 34 students and
employees. 9 The official explanation given was that the channel was
illegal since the university had not requested government authorization.
The government also stated that for the same reason, the installations
had been requisitioned in order to prevent the channel from transmit-
ting. This was done despite the fact that the law expressly provided
that the universities could establish and maintain television stations
without any governmental authorization.
-8. Only at the end of August, 1973, a few days before the military coup, did Allende's
last Minister of the Interior, a lawyer and professor at the law. school who attempted
to stop a great number of illegalities, give the channel back to the university. When
it was returned, its installations had been practically dismantled and it could not trans-
mit for several months.
9. As a lawyer for the university, I presented a petition of "habeas corpus" in favor
of the 34 persons under arrest. It was immediately granted and the same day the Court
of Appeals of Santiago ordered their unconditional release.
With the frankness and objectivity that I am utilizing, I must make clear that the
permanent and continuous illegalities of the UP government and its reluctance to carry
out many judicial sentences did not occur in the area of criminal justice, especially in
regard to personal freedom and human dignity. The case I referred to above is a good
example of how the "habeas corpus" petition was an efficient tool to defend these rights
and how the government obeyed it and carried it out immediately. The excesses, out-
rages, and even deaths that occurred were committed by extremist revolutionaries but
never by government agents. In this area, the government may have been too passive
to enforce respect for many rights violated by other citizens, but as far as I know-
and I consider myself well informed-during Allende's government the administrative
institutions and the police maintained Chile's juridical and legal tradition of respect for
the individual and his rights and freedom. If any exception can be found, it is only
the case that confirms the rule.
After my petition of "habeas corpus" was granted, I presented a criminal complaint
against the Intendente of Santiago and other important authorities for the crimes of
breaking into the University of Chile's television station, the arbitrary arrest of 34 per-
sons, and the destruction of the channel's transmitting equipment. Days before the mili-
tary coup, all of them had been legally charged with these crimes.
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The channel belonging to the Catholic University of Santiago was the
only important one that was not controlled by the Marxist forces.
Because of this, it reached an extremely large audience. It was the only
means to hear opinions or information other than that given by the
government. The authorities of the Catholic University decided to
expand their channel to other provinces, exercising the legal right to do
so. Nevertheless, their decision clashed with the government's policy,
and-resulted in the government's jamming the transmission of the chan-
nel in Concepcion, Chile's most important southern city. This caused
meetings of protest, the instigation of criminal proceedings, and the
death of one individual. Still, it was impossible to alter the course of
the government. The decision of the UP to maintain the monopoly over
telecommunications and thus disseminate distorted and biased informa-
tion, was unbreakable. Other measures against freedom of information
were subtle, clever, and dangerous, but they were equally illegal and
signified a great threat to the freedom of information guaranteed by the
Constitution."0
10. I will refer to a measure that, if it had been maintained any longer, would have
meant the disappearance or bankruptcy of all the newspapers and television channels op-
posed to the UP government.
To understand this measure, it is necessary to explain that Chilean institutions of pub-
lic administration, the semifiscal entities, and the state companies created by CORFO
whose administration is rigorously controlled by the state (even if large portions of their
capital are private) cover a fundamental sector in the economic life of the country. Be-
cause of this, previous governments had always taken special care to see that their offi-
cial publications and propaganda were adequately distributed in all the public media.
Think, for example, about the large amounts of money usually spent by the Internal
Revenue Service in official communications and instructions published throughout the
country. The same is true of the numerous social security institutions and important
state companies, such as the National Oil Company (ENAP), the National Electricity
Company (ENDESA), etc., with respect to the same type of advertisements and of the
substantial advertising of the companies created and controlled by CORFO. This sector
had greatly expanded due to the considerable number of private companies that had been
illegally and arbitrarily transferred to the "social area" by means of "requisitions" and
"interventions."
This decisive and fundamental sector of the economy, given its real economic poten-
tial, received precise orders to make its publications and all its advertising exclusively
through the radio stations, newspapers, and television channels that supported the gov-
ernment. They also were subject to an emphatic prohibition against spending one cent
in the newspapers, radio, and television stations not devoted to the UP.
Further, the private companies that had been "requisitioned" or "intervened" began to
to spend enormous amounts of money, frequently disproportionate and ruinous to
their financial possibilities, in advertisements, propaganda, and even economic assistance
for the news media devoted to the government.
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H. CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN
In this section I shall examine a few aspects of the legal struggle
which occurred in Chile and which are of great judicial and constitu-
tional importance. In doing so, I believe it will be clear that Allende
had decided, in a calculated and premeditated manner, to violate the
constitution in order to achieve the goal of Marxist domination of
power. In so doing, he employed a number of legal strategisms which
not only created juridical problems, they also played a large role in the
breakdown of the legal system in Chile and in the chaos which this
produced in the period just before the military coup.
A. Decrees of Insistence
In Chile a public institution called the Contralorfa General of the
Republic was established by the Constitution and was almost a fourth
state power. It was completely autonomous and its essential duties were
to exercise preventitive control over the legality of executive acts and to
supervise and approve expenditures of public funds in accordance with
the law. In order to carry out its first duty, every decree dictated by the
President, and all administrative resolutions of the public agencies had
to be sent to the Contralorfa for its analysis and approval prior to being
officially promulgated. In the event the Contralorfa considered the
decrees of resolutions illegal, it rejected and remanded them, thereby
rendering them unenforceable. However, there were exceptions to this
general principle, one of which was that in extraordinary cases where
there was an evident urgency for the enforcement of the decree, the
Contraloria could permit the immediate execution prior to its approval.
It was clearly understood, however, that the decree would become void
if the Contraloria later rejected it. The maximum period for passing on
a decree was one month; and normally this period was not exceeded.
There were occasions, however, where time was clearly of the essence.
In certain emergencies, for example a strike in an important public
service such as public transportation, where there would be legal
grounds for the appointment by the President of an intervenor to act
quickly to keep the service operating and to resolve the conflict, it would
be practically impossible to proceed through the normal channels of
review.
The Chilean law provided a solution for certain serious disagreements
between the executive and the Contralorfa concerning the legality of a
supreme decree which the executive considered as the solution to the
urgent problem. In these extreme situations, i.e., when the executive
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and the Contraloria disagreed about the legal interpretation of a decree,
the decision of the executive was to prevail provided a new decree was
issued, signed this time not only by the President but by all his ministers
as well, insisting that the Contraloria approve the decree, and permit its
enforcement. This new decree was called a "Decree of Insistence." By
its very nature the Decree of Insistence was exceptional and its sole
objective was to provide a solution in certain cases of conflict of inter-
pretation. In these instances the Contraloria could not reject the Decree
of Insistence, but had to send an official document containing all
records of the matter to the Chamber of Deputies. If the Chamber
determined that the executive had violated the law and that the Contra-
loria was correct, it could then initiate impeachment procedings against
a minister, some of them, or the President himself. The Chamber could
also conclude-as happened frequently in the past-that the problem
was not really clear and that the executive properly insisted on the
decree because of the seriousness and urgency of the situation. In this
case, no action had to be taken, and the records were simply filed. This
system functioned efficiently for many years. It was always used ration-
ally by preceeding governments and never produced any serious difficul-
ties. However, it was utilized by the Allende government to complete
its illegal requisitions and "interventions" of factories, mines, shopping
centers, and farms. Because these requisitions and interventions had to
be carried out within the existing institutional system, the executive had
to dictate the respective "requisition" or "intervention" decrees and send
them to the Contraloria. Under Allende's government, every time the
Contraloria rejected one of these decrees for being illegal, which oc-
curred with increasing frequency, the President and his ministers issued
a Decree of Insistence forcing the Contraloria to approve it. This
became a more or less habitual form of administering the country. It
was evident that this procedure, marginally legal at best, was being
abused, since it is inconceivable that this exceptional legal institution
was intended to permit the executive systematically to violate the law."'
11. The problem gradually worsened. In April, 1973, the Contraloria had rejected as
illegal hundreds of decrees of requisitions affecting important factories based on the ad-
herence of their managers to the empresorial strike of October, 1972. The President
then ordered that just one Decree of Insistence be issued forcing the Contraloria to ap-
prove all the decrees that had been rejected as being illegal. There were very strong
protests from the members of the Congress and from the opposition press, but to no
effect. Some suggested the possibility of impeaching the entire cabinet. This was not
done because it was thought that it would only make more acute the crisis between the
executive and the legislature. There were voices heard still calling for good sense and
prudence. This situation obviously led to tension between the government and the Con-
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B. Breakdown of the Judiciary
The Constitution of 1925 categorically established the judiciary as a
state power and, therefore, autonomous, independent, and supreme with
respect to the administration of justice. According to our system where-
by the public force depends on the executive branch, the law establishes
that the administrative agents who represent the President in the politi-
cal subdivision of the country, that is, intendentes and governors,
"should provide the public force necessary to execute the decisions of
the judiciary without inquiring into the substance of the decisions nor
whether they are just or not."
In many of the cases analyzed previously, those dealing with "requisi-
tions," "interventions," and simple "take-overs" of companies, factories,
mines, farms, and even apartment buildings, the people affected turned
successfully to the courts. Many judgments were obtained ordering the
return to their legal owners of factories or estates illegally requisitioned
or intervened. In the case of "take-overs," the return was also ordered
and sometimes the invaders who had committed crimes such as usurpa-
tion, kidnapping, or trespass were convicted and sentenced. To carry
out these sentences, the assistance of the public force was indispensable,
but the official requests of judges asking for this assistance were not
obeyed and generally were not even answered. The judges and the
affected parties themselves brought these facts to the attention of the
Supreme Court, which pointed out the illegality to the executive, but to
no avail.
This situation naturally produced a great deal of tension between the
judiciary and the executive. This increased even more when the Su-
preme Court became the target of severe criticism from UP political
leaders and the leftist press. In very explicit and base terms, the
Supreme Court was accused of opposing and sabotaging the "revolu-
tionary process" with their "bourgeois class justice."
The judiciary's protests to the executive, that sentences could not be
executed because of the government's failure to act, became very intense
and heated. In October, 1972 the Supreme Court sent an official letter
to the President informing him of "the absolute necessity of instructing
tralorfa, which naturally was outraged. This struggle continued to grow worse when the
then Minister of Finance refused to carry out the sanctions legally imposed by the Con-
tralorfa on an important functionary of the regime, who had refused to obey a subpoena
issued by the Contralorfa. Soon thereafter, a practically complete breakdown occurred
when the Contralorfa rejected the partial and discriminatory promulgation, as ordered
by President Allende, of the constitutional amendment previously approved by Congress.
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his cabinet to instruct in turn their subordinates to adhere strictly to the
decisions that, in the exercise of their constitutional attributions, ema-
nate from the ordinary courts of justice." In this letter the Supreme
Court also called on the President to instruct his subordinates to show
the judiciary the courtesy which it deserved. But a few months later the
Intendente of Santiago declared to the press that he would not provide
the public force for the return of any of the intervened companies
pursuant to the judgments, because this "could cause serious incidents
and public disturbances." At the same time, the Minister of the Interi-
or sent a "confidential memo" to all the intendentes and governors
ordering them not to exercise the public force to carry out any judgment
unless the Minister himself considered it convenient.
The conflict became even more intense and in May, 1973, the Su-
preme Court sent an emphatic official letter to the President directly
mentioning "the breakdown of the legal order in the country." In one
paragraph the Court stated:
This Court must protest to you, as it has done innumerable times in the
past, about the illegal acts of the administrative authorities who are
illicitly interfering with the proper exercise of judicial power, and who
are preventing the police force from carrying out criminal sentences
duly emanating from the criminal courts, when, according to the laws,
these sentences should be carried out by said force without any ob-
stacles. These acts signify a decided obstinacy in rebelling against the
judicial sentences and a total lack of concern about the alteration that
these attitudes and omissions have produced in the juridical order.
All of this no longer means a simple crisis of state under the rule of
Law, as was manifested to you in our previous letter, but a peremptory
or imminent rupture of the country's legality.
This time the President answered with a long and harsh letter in
which he made serious charges against the Supreme Court for some of
its decisions and accused it of partiality and insensibility with respect to
the claims of the poor while efficiently taking care of the cases of the
rich. Regarding the execution of juridical sentences, his theory was that
the government, as "warrantor of peace and public order," should
analyze each case and make its own judgments on the merits as to
whether or not it would grant the assistance of the public force to carry
them out.
The Supreme Court replied in furious and sarcastic terms. It said,
for example:
The President has undertaken the task, specially difficult and painful
for him since he only knows the Law through hearsay, of determining
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for this Supreme Court the rules for the interpretation of the Law, a
duty which in -the matters entrusted to it, belongs exclusively to the
judiciary and not to the executive.
In another paragraph it added that "until now, it has not been noticed
that Your Excellency has used his presidential authority and influence
where he could and should, in order to stop the abusive publicity."
The President returned the official letter without answer, due to the
"disrespectful and inappropriate terms in which it was written." The
Supreme Court replied that "the action of the President of the Republic
of returning the letter to this Tribunal is unacceptable, since the problem
affects two State Powers of equal constitutional importance, between
which there is no subordination."
This was the definite breakdown between both powers. It was July,
1973. Two months later, the military coup would take place.
C. Circumvention of the Plebiscite
I now wish to turn to the last stage of the desperate fight for the
defense of legality in Chile. This particular problem led to the rupture
between the executive and the legislative power. With this crisis, the
Allende government suffered a definitive institutional collapse and, in
the final irony, dug its own grave. This crisis was produced over the
handling of the constitutional amendment dealing with the three areas of
the reformed economy.
It was evident that the only way of legally forming a "social area" was
by expropriating private companies and paying just compensation for
them. This required a congressional enactment; as previously noted,
the UP program itself admitted this. But no expropriation bills were
ever sent to the Congress, except one to nationalize the great American-
owned copper mining companies-a bill unanimously approved by
Congress. In all the other cases, the Allende regime preferred requisi-
tions and interventions.
It was indisputable that constitutionally and legally the only acceptable
manner to permit that transfer of companies from the "private area" to
the "social area" was through the law. However, because the govern-
ment had in fact used non-legal means, the opposition wished to reaf-
firm the principle of the rule of law through an explicit and detailed
amendment to the Constitution.
In one more attempt to find a solution to the daily increases of
illegality, the Christian Democratic party, through two of its senators-
one of whom, Senator Fuentealba, was violently deported by the military
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government-proposed a constitutional amendment. The objective of
this amendment was to establish very clearly the form and procedures
for transferring companies to and from the social area.
The Christian-Democratic proposal, which also contained provisions
dealing with the participation of workers in the administration of their
companies, was approved with minor modifications by a substantial
majority of the Congress. In compliance with the constitutional re-
quirements, after being separately approved by both Houses, the amend-
ment had to be ratified by the Congress in Plenary Session. This
occurred, by a large majority, at the beginning of 1972. But at that
time a very heated public debate had started in which the executive
announced it would veto the amendment and advocated the theory that
Congress needed a two-thirds vote in order to override a presidential
veto.
It is useful to recall now my earlier explanation about the constitu-
tional amendment approved in 1970, during Frei's presidency, in which
a national plebiscite was clearly established and regulated as a solution
in case of a dispute between the legislature and the executive over
constitutional amendments. Logically, that amendment did away with
the previous clause that required a two-thirds vote by the Congress to
override a presidential veto. The President now had an alternative in
the case of a disagreement: he could call a national plebiscite. Never-
theless, the President and the UP leaders maintained, through unintelli-
gible arguments, that the previous clause was still in force.
At the beginning of Allende's term, he boasted that he was not
worried about the great congressional majority which opposed him,
because he was backed by the people and, therefore, if he called a
plebiscite, he could make all the constitutional reforms he desired. In
the interview granted to Debray, to which I referred before, in response
to a pessimistic question by the French journalist who thought that in
Chile "bourgeois democracy was untouched," Allende stated:
We have said that we will take advantage of certain aspects of the
present Constitution in order to open the way for a new one: the
people's constitution. Why? Because in Chile we can do it. We will
introduce a bill and the Congress will reject it; we will then call a
plebiscite. For example: if we propose doing away with a bicameral
congress and the Congress rejects it, we will call a referendum and we
will win it. Well, that finishes -the two Houses and we will have a
single House as we proposed. Who are the people going to elect to
that House? Their representatives, I suppose . . ..
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A year and a half later the government unconditionally refused to call a
plebiscite. It is clear that Congress maintained that the only constitu-
tional resolution to the definite rejection of the presidential veto was the
plebiscite. Thus, before the veto was even sent to Congress one could
see a very serious constitutional problem arising.
The negotiations in search of a solution began anew. The Minister of
Justice, ex-Dean of the Law School of the University of Concepci6n and
a member of the P.I.R. party that fought within the government to avoid
excesses and arbitrary actions, was asked by the President to negotiate
an understanding with the Christian Democrats so that the veto would
be approved by the Congress. When the understanding had been
achieved, Allende, pressured by the extremists in his government, re-
tracted his Minister's authority and put an end to the negotiations. This
caused the withdrawal of the P.I.R. from the UP government.
The government then sent to Congress a much more defiant and
obstinate veto than the one that had served as the basis for the Minister
of Justice's discussion with the Christian Democrats. Predictably, the
Congress, after a prolonged debate, rejected the veto by a large majority;
however it fell short of two-thirds. According to the explicit text of the
Constitution, the President upon receiving Congress' official communi-
cation of its rejection of the veto, had to call a plebiscite within a
specified number of days. If the President failed to call a plebiscite
within that time, he was automatically required to promulgate and
publish the amendment approved by Congress.
Thus, at the beginning of 1973 public tension reached a new high.
The opposition challenged the President and the UP to lay aside its legal
subtleties and call a plebiscite. The opposition said that it was now the
people's turn to resolve the conflict. Allende stubbornly refused.
The President then decided to submit the conflict to the Constitution-
al Tribunal. This Tribunal, at the end of May, 1973, declared itself-
correctly in my opinion-without subject-matter jurisdiction because it
was not authorized by the Constitution to entertain this type of question.
The constitutional period for calling a plebiscite had expired and
Allende had not called it. Constitutionally, he was then obliged to
promulgate the amendment, but he refused to do so. He then proceed-
ed on a strange course, not authorized by any clause in the Constitution:
he issued a decree promulgating portions of the constitutional amend-
ment. These portions were with respect to matters upon which the
President and the Congress had not been in dispute. The Contraloria
rejected the decree as illegal, holding that as the time for calling a
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plebiscite had lapsed, the President had no alternative but to promulgate
the entire amendment approved by Congress. It was July, 1973, and
President Allende reiterated his decision not to promulgate the complete
amendment.
At this time, in addition to the President's stand, we must point out
that "take-overs" of factories and companies were occurring on a daily
basis; that social, institutional, and economic chaos was present every-
where; that social indiscipline had reached incredible extremes and that
daily life lacked the most elementary sense of security. For example,
with increasing frequency the streets were full of thousands of public
workers whose only task, it seemed, was to parade around in state-
owned vehicles of all types, screaming insults and threats against every-
one who did not applaud the government. As a natural reaction to all
of this, many street demonstrations in opposition to the government
occurred, calling for the President's resignation.
During this same period, the violent breakdown between the govern-
ment and the judiciary had recently taken place; there had also been
frequent and serious difficulties with the Contraloria, culminating with
the battle over the constitutional amendment just mentioned. The
President's refusal to promulgate the constitutional amendment led to
the breakdown between the presidency and the legislature, the latter
being the most genuine and direct representative of the people, particu-
larly because the overwhelming majority of its members had been
elected only four months before.
On August 22, 1973, the House of Deputies, which according to the
Constitution is the only branch of Congress charged with supervising the
executive, approved by a great majority a lengthy resolution concerning
the government. This resolution analyzed all the illegalities and abuses
committed by the government up to, and including, its failure to pro-
mulgate, as required by the Constitution, the amendment approved by
the Congress. This resolution ended by stating, among other things,
that its purpose was
to make clear to the President, to his cabinet, to the members of the
Armed Forces and to the national police force, the serious breach in
the constitutional and legal order which the previous mentioned facts
and circumstances implied; to make clear to the same persons and in-
stitutions that because of their oath of loyalty to -the Constitution and
the laws, and, in the case of the Armed Forces and police because of
the nature of their institutions, it was their obligation to put an immedi-
ate end to all situations which violated the Constitution and the laws,
for the purpose of restricting Government actions to legal means and to
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assure the constitutional structure of our country and the essential basis
of democratic life among Chileans.
Allende replied in a "Declaration to -the Country," in which he
accused the opposition of "formally exhorting the Armed Forces and the
Police Force to adopt a deliberative position before the Executive and to
break their duty to obey the Government." With respect to himself, he
insisted that he had respected the law and swore that "together with the
people, he would, without vacillation, fulfill his obligations."
A few days later, on September 11, 1973, Allende was removed from
office by the military forces.
